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Post mortem procreation in French and British Law 
In the field of medically-assisted procreation (MAP), new gamete-freezing 
techniques have been developed for application to sperm cells, egg cells, and 
embryos. Donations initially intended for couples can also be made to single women. 
Likewise, patients undergoing treatment that is liable to make them sterile have 
solicited the services of sperm and ova banks, in order to preserve their fertility in the 
future. The possibility for the individual to preserve his or her own gametes has 
broadened the vision of intentional parenthood, hitherto limited to a couple-based 
model. 
More generally, the increased weight granted to individual will in this process 
is likely to distance policymakers from the model imitating spontaneous procreation. 
A parallel means of reproduction, independent from the traditional family model, is 
gradually emerging for single men and women. 
According to Marcel Gauchet1, a prominent French sociologist, the more a 
child is the fruit of invention as opposed to nature, the more he is desired. He 
“belongs” to his parent or parents, rather than to society. This statement has social 
ramifications worthy of investigation. As reproduction becomes possible outside the 
structure of the couple, traditionally required by society, single people are considering 
parenthood on their own. An age-old reproductive necessity is being challenged. 
MAP offers technological solutions to single men and women wishing to 
become parents. The scientific fact has been approached differently by French and 
British legislators. Before dealing with the question of reproduction following a 
partner’s death, that is, posthumous or post-mortem procreation (section 2), we shall 
briefly present the laws governing access to MAP for single women2 in France and 
Britain (section 1). The two issues are closely related. If MAP is authorized for single 
                                                 
1 M. Gauchet, “L’enfant du désir”, Le Débat, n°132, Nov.-Dec. 2004, p. 98. 
2 Let us note that neither of the two systems has ever authorized access to MAP for single men. 
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women, there is no reason to deny it to women who wish to bear the child or children 
of a partner who consented to parenthood before dying. The criterion of the welfare of 
the child is the same in both cases. 
1) MAP access for single women 
The question of access to MAP for single women is entirely unrelated to the 
issues of adoption or abortion. In the latter two areas, women have the right to choose, 
even though society is solicited in both cases. However, in the field of MAP, France 
has denied access to single women since the program’s inception, because MAP was 
historically intended for heterosexual couples. British law, by contrast, has never 
banned access to single women. 
French legislation explicitly refuses access to MAP for single persons. Article 
L 2142-2, al. 2 of the French public health code states “the man and woman forming 
the couple3 must be alive and of reproductive age, and must have given prior consent 
to the embryo transfer or insemination. Obstacles to insemination or embryo transfer 
are constituted by the death of one of the members of the couple, initiation of divorce 
or separation proceedings, or cessation of cohabitation, as well as either partner’s 
written revocation of consent, filed with the doctor in charge of proceeding with the 
medically assisted procreation procedure”. The fact that access to MAP is contingent 
on the pathological nature of medically-diagnosed infertility4 excludes any request by 
a single woman for artificial insemination: such a request would be a matter of 
personal convenience rather than medical necessity. Performing MAP procedures for 
any purpose other than the ones defined by the law is punishable by up to 5 years in 
prison and a fine of 75,000 euros5. 
Nevertheless, despite the importance of the couple-based “parental project”, a 
founding concept of the French legislative apparatus, the field of donations is 
beginning to show evidence that a more individualistic trend is developing, 
overshadowing the couple. It is true that the surviving partner alone has always 
determined the fate of the embryo, if the other partner dies6. However, as regards 
gamete donation, the hypothesis was initially considered differently. Before sperm-
donation procedures were set by law, the CECOS banks (Centre d’Étude et de 
                                                 
3 French law n° 2011-814 dated 7 July 2011 on bioethics deleted the requirement for the couple to have 
been living together for at least two years. 
4 Art. L 2142-2, al. 1, CSP. 
5 Art. 511-24, C. pén.; art. L. 2162-5, CSP. 
6 Art. L 2142-4, II, CSP. 
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Conservation des Oeufs et du Sperme humains), where sperm donation originated, 
promoted the concept of a “couple-to-couple” donation. The couple-based model was 
a precaution taken for the purposes of avoiding any association of insemination with 
adultery7. The founders of the CECOS8 supported the original, three-pillar French 
regime: the donor had to be married, or at least living in a stable couple; he had to 
have had children already; and his wife’s consent was required. 
Whereas the original draft of Article L1244-2 of the public health code 
permitted gamete donation only if the “couple” had already reproduced9, in 200410 the 
lawmaker accepted donor sperm from single people, as long as they had already 
reproduced11. The purpose of the latter condition was to avoid any regret, in 
retrospect, on the part of childless people whose gametes had been given to another 
couple. During the debate prior to the revision of 201112, several thinkers advocated 
eliminating the requirement that the donor, male or female, have reproduced earlier13, 
granting greater powers to the donor’s decision-making abilities. Currently, there is a 
shortage of gametes. In order to encourage egg-cell donations from young women, 
who produce the highest quality of oocytes, the law was changed. Henceforth, if the 
donor is over the age of 18, the reproduction requirement is waived. He is offered the 
option to collect and conserve some of his gametes or germ tissues should he wish to 
proceed with medically assisted procreation for himself at a later date14. 
The United Kingdom has never denied access to MAP to single women. The 
1990 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act stated only one condition: the child’s 
welfare, and his or her need for a father. According to §13(5), “a woman shall not be 
provided with treatment services unless account has been taken of the welfare of any 
child who may be born as a result of the treatment (including the need of that child 
for a father), and of any other child who may be affected by the birth”. In 2008, this 
                                                 
7 Simone Bateman (Les passeurs des gamètes, Presses Universitaires de Nancy, 1994) believes this 
policy was related to the Catholic beliefs of the founder of the CECOS, George David. She shows that 
religious considerations played a key role in the elaboration of the entire French bioethics model. 
David, a committed Catholic, conferred with priests and theologians in an effort to produce an 
innovative Catholic vision of MAP. It was primordial to avoid any assimilation of the practice with 
adultery. In this context, David invented the specifically French concept of the couple-to-couple 
donation. The instruction issued by the Vatican in 1987, Donum vitae: On Respect for Human Life in 
Its Origin and the Dignity of Procreation, stripped David of his illusions, for it condemned all forms of 
both conjugal and extra-conjugal assisted reproduction. 
8 G. David, “Don de sperme: le lien entre l’anonymat et le bénévolat”, Andrologie, 2010, 20, p. 63-67. 
9 “The donor must belong to a couple that has already reproduced”. 
10 French law n° 2004-800 dated 6 August 2004 on bioethics. 
11 “The donor has to have reproduced”. 
12 French law n° 2011-814 dated 7 July 2011 on bioethics. 
13 Professor René Frydman, interview with Radio France Info, 12 Nov. 2010. 
14 Art. L 1244-2, al. 3, CSP. 
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condition was replaced, and the law now states the child’s need for a “supportive 
parent” 15 further confirming potential access for single women. 
Single women have the right to obtain donor insemination (DI) as well as 
surrogacy. However, unlike heterosexual and homosexual couples, who can request 
that the court establish their parental relationship to the child by specific procedure, 
namely Parental Order, single women must file for adoption in order to establish 
motherhood of a child born by surrogacy. 
Two options are available to them. The first is by obtaining donor sperm and a 
donor egg (if the intentional mother’s oocyte cannot be used; British legislation 
impose no ban whatsoever on the donation of both gametes) and by surrogacy. This 
course can only be carried out by an approved clinic. 
The second option consists of insemination with donor sperm, to be used to 
fertilize her own egg cells. This process does not necessarily involve admission to an 
approved clinic, because it can be carried out at home (the “turkey-baster method”). 
In practice, it seems that the great majority of these single women finance the 
MAP treatments themselves. Only one fifth of the National Health Service (NHS) 
centers meet the standards set by the NICE (National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence)16 in 2004, regarding the three courses of IVF treatment they should 
offer.17 As a result, certain legal scholars, like Emily Jackson18, are careful to 
distinguish between the category of women raising children in single-parent families 
exposed to the risk of poverty, and a second category of women who have access to 
MAP, a choice they can afford. 
2) Post-mortem reproduction 
Although cases of post-mortem reproduction are extremely rare, the question 
is an opportunity to gain insight into the social purpose of MAP (because society is 
solicited): is it a remedy for infertility, or a new way of giving life? The right to post-
mortem reproduction is related to the extension of autonomy, but it can also reflect a 
natalist policy. Post-mortem reproduction also involves the question of equality 
                                                 
15 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 2008. 
16 NICE is an independent agency that sets standards and issues clinical guidelines. These 
recommendations are not mandatory, but they do have an impact on the availability of healthcare in the 
public sector. To review NICE guidelines and on the application and use of NHS resources, see 
http://nice.org.uk 
17 “Single women being offered IVF on the NHS,” Telegraph, 24 Oct. 2011; “A fifth of PCTs offer 
single women IVF on the NHS,” 31 Oct. 2011, R. Paxman, BioNews 631. 
18 E. Jackson, Medical Law, Oxford University Press, 2nd ed. 2010, p. 772. 
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between men and women. It can be articulated with surrogacy because technically, 
men could also use embryos conceived with a deceased partner, or her egg cells19. 
In Europe, the countries that authorize post-mortem reproduction, like 
Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, make no distinction 
between the use of frozen sperm and embryo transfer. This absence of distinction is 
coherent, if we consider that the will of the couple to pursue plans for parenthood 
must be fulfilled beyond the death of one of the members of the couple, and that this 
is so regardless of how far they have technically advanced towards this fulfillment. 
Likewise, from the child’s point of view, the criterion of his or her welfare is not 
affected by the choice between post-mortem insemination or embryo transfer. 
Conversely, the two practices could be dissociated, in order to authorize post-mortem 
embryo transfer. The distinction could be justified by the lack of symmetry between 
sperm and embryos, and the recognition that existing embryos deserve some respect. 
The principal arguments in favor of authorizing access to post-mortem 
reproduction are: 
- The autonomy of widows committed to assuming single parenthood: they could 
demand this right on the grounds that other women have the right to choose to have 
children unrecognized by a biological father; no one forces them to abort fatherless 
children. 
- The fact that these situations are not the product of the development of MAP and 
especially IVF alone, because a woman whose partner happens to die during the 
pregnancy faces the same choice, and is not required to terminate her pregnancy as a 
consequence. 
- That the point is to continue a parental intention that has been carefully thought out, 
at least in the case of an embryo transfer. 
- Because the number of such cases is statistically limited, authorizing post-mortem 
reproduction would have no impact on society as a whole. 
                                                 
19 “A Request for Retrieval of Oocytes from a 36-Year-Old Woman with Anoxic Brain Injury”, New 
England Journal of Medicine, vol. 363, n°3, 15 July 2010, p. 276-283, Case 21-2010, David M. Greer, 
M.D., Aaron K. Styer, M.D., Thomas L. Toth, M.D., Charles P. Kindregan, J.D., LL.M., and Javier M. 
Romero, M.D. Also, for a study of various provisions made by US state legislatures, with the financial 
implications of authorization, see K. KNAPLUND, “Legal Issues of Maternity and Inheritance for the 
Biotech Child of the 21st Century”, Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Journal, vol. 43, No. 3, 2008, 
Pepperdine University Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009/01, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1334915 
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- That because it is in the child’s interest to be born, he or she will feel even more 
desired, and will have a father figure – an abstract one, true, but an undeniable father. 
A contrario, opponents of authorizing post-mortem reproduction cite the 
following arguments: 
- Society has the right to investigate, because it is solicited to assist and program the 
birth of a child whose father is dead. 
- Single-parent households, often associated with poverty, should be avoided. 
- The child’s interest is ignored, because he or she would be growing up fatherless, in 
an incomplete family structure. 
- No one has “the right to a child”; post-mortem reproduction is a selfish desire, a 
deviation caused by MAP; it is against Nature and does not deserve to be encouraged. 
- Post-mortem reproduction deprecates the mortal human condition we all share; it is 
the fulfillment of an inappropriate desire for self-perpetuation. To quote Professor 
Carbonnier, “even if the procedure was not judged in the least immoral, it would have 
to be held illicit: it is a bid for immortality, even on a reduced scale, whereas mortality 
is unconditional”20. 
- It is impossible to obtain truly informed consent from the man, who cannot realize 
the extent of his commitment. 
- Women who are bereaved are subject to pressure; sometimes, their request for MAP 
may reflect a struggle to work through grief, more than a real desire to have a child. 
- No legal system has ever considered the embryo as a person: as a result, post-
mortem embryo transfer cannot be authorized on the grounds that the embryo exists. 
- Authorizing post-mortem reproduction discriminates against fertile couples who, 
since they do not resort to IVF, have no embryos available, should one partner die. 
- Post-mortem reproduction could be a source of complications in the field of 
parenthood law, and especially inheritance rights, where abuses might follow. 
On the European level, the absence of consensus between the member states 
on the scientific and legal definition of the start of life makes the departure point for 
the right to life a subject that the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) allows 
                                                 
20 J. Carbonnier, Droit civil, t.1, Les personnes, Presses universitaires de France, Coll. Thémis, 18th ed., 
n° 20. 
                            Karène Parizer-Krief 
 
97 
member states to rule upon21. So far, it has been impossible to determine a common 
position on the issue of post-mortem embryo transfer. 
French legislation has not authorized access to any form of post-mortem 
reproduction, and as a result, the issue has been hotly debated and cases have been 
brought before the courts. There are two reasons why the practice has not been the 
focus of as much controversy in the United Kingdom. First, a clear legal framework 
has been set up, and second, cases of post-mortem reproduction are rare. In fact, the 
UK even permits post-mortem reproduction through surrogacy, a MAP practice that is 
banned in France. 
In France, as we said, the law22 requires that the man and woman who are the 
prospective parents must be alive, and must give prior consent to embryo transfer or 
insemination. These two conditions rule out any possibility of post-mortem 
reproduction. 
Post-mortem embryo transfer and insemination are understood to be outside 
the purposes of MAP; e.g., to help a couple with a clearly diagnosed pathological 
infertility to have a child. 
The presence of the man and woman is inspected at the time of the intake 
interview with the physician23. The physician is supposed to be informed if either 
partner dies between intake and the day scheduled for the treatment. This legal norm 
is confirmed by Article 311-20 al. 3 of the French Civil Code, which stipulates that in 
case one partner dies, permission for MAP is revoked. Although French criminal law 
does not provide for any specific charges in the case of post mortem reproduction, 
engaging in MAP procedures for any purpose other than those defined by the law24 
carries criminal penalties for the physician25. The Guide to Good Practices26 stipulates 
that frozen sperm cannot be delivered to anyone except for the patient himself, within 
the framework of gamete conversation for the use of the patient himself. 
                                                 
21 CEDH, 8 July 2004, Vo c/ France, n° 53924/00 (D. 2004, p. 2456 (PRADEL); JCP 2004, II, 10158 
(LEVINET); D. Chr. 2004, p. 2801 (SERVERIN). 
22 Art. L 2142-2, CSP. 
23 Art. L 2141-10, CSP. 
24 Art. L 2141-2, CSP. 
25 Art. 511-24, C. pénal stipulates a 5-year prison sentence and 75,000-euro fine. 
26 Ministerial decree dated 3 August 2010 regarding rules for good clinical and biological practices in 
MAP (French Ministry of Health and Sports, published in the Journal Officiel dated 11 September 
2010). 
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Conversely, the surviving partner may give permission for an embryo to be 
donated to another couple27. 
The legislative ban on any form of post-mortem reproduction goes back to the 
1994 law, the terms of which were discussed at length at the time the bill was 
drafted28. 
This law followed the Braibant Report of 198829, recommending a ban on 
pursuing plans for parenthood in case of the death of one of the members of the 
couple, even if while alive the husband had given his consent for this use. The authors 
of this report expressed the opinion that “it seems excessive to give a person the 
extreme power to impose on another the amputation of half of his ancestry”, for even 
in single-parent families (following divorce or death), the child has two parents (he is 
entitled to inherit from both parents, to be fed by both, to bear the name of both, etc.). 
“The admission of single women… changes the conception of MAP at the root. It 
makes this procedure a form of convenience freely available to any individual, a pure 
and simple alternative to natural procreation”30. 
Before the 1994 law went into effect, post-mortem reproduction was 
condemned by jurisprudence when courts rejected requests for the return of sperm 
samples. The first ruling published in this field concerned the Parpalaix case, which 
                                                 
27 Art. L 2141-5, al.2, CSP. 
28 From the outset, the first draft bill (Law n°94-654) prohibited post-mortem procreation by 
establishing the following condition for access to MAP: “the members of the couple must be living at 
the time of the insemination or of the transfer of fertilized human eggs”. This wording was later 
rectified: the term “couple” was replaced by “the man and woman forming the couple” to exclude 
homosexual couples, and because a couple is not considered to be a legal entity. 
An amendment supporting post-mortem transfer was suggested by the Communist Party caucus at the 
first Senate review of the bill (amendment 177 JO Sénat 18 January 1994, p.239), to preserve 
individual freedom, as long as a certain time frame was imposed. This amendment was rejected. 
Modifications made to the draft bill chiefly concerned what would happen to the embryos should one 
of the partners die. From the outset, provision was made for these embryos to be made available to 
another couple, upon request. However, the second time the French National Assembly reviewed the 
bill, an amendment suggested by the committee was adopted, according to which “should one of the 
members of the couple die, embryo conservation shall be terminated”. 
On this subject, differences of opinion appeared during parliamentary debates, but finally, the first 
option is the one stipulated in the text of the law that was passed. The second draft bill (n° 94- 653) 
strengthened the prohibition established by the first, because it added a requirement for the couple’s 
prior consent, and asserted that the consent was null and void in case a death occurred before MAP had 
been carried out. This statement was a way of condemning embryo implantation after a husband’s 
death. A reference to prior consent to art. L. 152-2, CSP was finally added to the first text. 
29 G. Braibant, Sciences de la vie, de l’éthique au droit, La Documentation française, 1988. 
30 Ibid., p. 57. This opinion was shared by the authors of the Mattéi Report (J.-F. MATTÉI, La vie en 
questions, pour une éthique biomédicale, La Documentation française, 1994), who considered that 
“despite all of the arguments, all of an emotional order, it does not seem congruent with the normal 
course of things and with the child’s welfare to accept the deliberate conception of an orphaned child”. 
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had been covered in the media. The District Court of Créteil had ruled in 198431 to 
allow a widow to recover sperm from the CECOS sperm bank. It avoided the issue of 
how the sperm would later be used – e.g., for insemination – which, in the absence of 
any law, was considered to be subject to the judgment of the physician and the 
widow. The officials in charge of the CECOS, vehemently opposed to the 
consequences of this ruling, began to have sperm donors sign a contract stipulating 
that the sperm they conserved under their own name could only be used by the 
depositor, “present and consenting”, and therefore living32. 
After this ruling, courts opposed restoring sperm samples. They explained that 
even if they were called upon to rule on the return of the samples alone, and not their 
subsequent use for insemination, the goal of recovering the gametes was 
insemination33. The same approach was taken to embryos: a spouse could not claim 
parental custody of an embryo, because an embryo is devoid of legal existence34. A 
decision by the Toulouse Appellate Court35 even ordered that frozen embryos be 
disposed of, asserting that because the goal of MAP was fighting sterility, when the 
couple no longer existed, there was no longer any reason to conserve the embryos. 
The only purpose of in vitro embryos was to lead to life (except for legal 
authorization); if it was impossible to implant them, they had to be disposed of. This 
ruling was appealed, and on January 9, 1996, the Cour de Cassation confirmed the 
ban on post-mortem embryo transfer36. However, it did not authorize the destruction 
of the embryos, due to the possibility they could be donated to another couple. Such 
donations were authorized by the law following the Appellate Court ruling. The Cour 
de Cassation stated that only constituted families were eligible for MAP, even before 
                                                 
31 TGI Créteil, 1st August 1984, no 4225/84, Parpalaix c/ CECOS: Gaz. Pal. 1984, 2, 560 (LESEC); 
JCP Gén., 1984, II, no 20321 (CORONE); RTD civ. 1984, p. 703 (REBULLIN-DEVICHI). 
32 B. Pulman, Mille et une façons de faire les enfants – La révolution des méthodes de procréation, 
Calmann – Lévy, 2010, p 72. 
33 TGI Toulouse, 26 March 1991, no 91-570, Galon c/ CECOS Midi-Pyrénées: JCP Gén. 1992, II, no 
21807 (PÉDROT); D. 1992, somm., p. 61 (LABBÉE); RTD civ. 1991, p. 310 (HAUSER); LPA, 26 April 
1991, n°50 (BERGOUNIOU). 
34 TGI Rennes, 30 June 1993, n°93001308, Orhan c/ CECOS de l’Ouest: JCP, Gén. 1994, I, n°22250 
(NEIRINCK); JCP, Gén., 1995, II, n°22472 (NEIRINCK). This ruling contradicted the recommendation 
of the Rennes bioethics committee, and was handed down after the French national bioethics council 
CCNE had issued an opinion endorsing the legalization of post-mortem embryo transfer. 
35  CA Toulouse, 18 April 1994, no 2563/93, P. c/ Centre hospitalier de la Grave, JCP, Gén. 1995, II, n° 
22472 (NEIRINCK). 
36 Cass., Civ. 1ère, 9 January 1996, n° 94-15998: D. 1996, p. 376 (DREIFUS-NETTER); LPA, 3 April 
1996, no 41 (MASSIP); JCP Gén.1996, II, no 22666 (NEIRINCK); LPA, 15 mai 1996, no 59 
(VIGNEAU); JCP 1996, n°44, 1560-62 (NEIRINCK); Def. 1996, p. 532 (MASSIP); RTD civ. 1996, p. 
359 (HAUSER). 
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the 1994 law went into effect, thereby ruling out both post-mortem insemination and 
embryo transfer37. 
After several parliamentary reports excluding the possibility of post-mortem 
insemination or IVF, but wishing to permit post-mortem embryo transfer38, and 
despite proposals to reformulate laws on inheritance and filiation to overcome 
technical problems that might arise39, the 2004 law maintained the interdiction of all 
forms of post-mortem reproduction, confirming its opposition to access to this 
practice in principle. A third paragraph was added to Article L 2141-2 of the French 
public health code (CSP): “insemination and embryo transfer are prohibited following 
the death of one of the members of the couple…” and clinics were obligated to inform 
candidates of “the prohibitions on carrying out a transfer of conserved embryos 
                                                 
37 “Whereas, even prior to the commencement of Art. L 152-2 of the French Public Health Code, 
originating with the law dated 29 July 1994, medically assisted procreation could have no legitimate 
goal other than to give birth to a child within a constituted family, thereby excluding access to an in-
vitro fertilization process, or the pursuit thereof, if the couple that intended to raise the child has been 
dissolved by the husband’s death prior to the completion of embryo transfer, the final step in this 
process”. 
38 Conseil d’État, Les lois de Bioéthique, cinq ans après, La Documentation française, 1999; OPECST, 
rapport n°232 (1998-1999), Feb. 1999, sur l’application de la loi n° 94-654 du 29 juillet 1994 
(HURIET, CLAEYS); Assemblée nationale, rapport n° 3525, January 2002, la délégation aux droits des 
femmes sur le projet de loi relatif à la bioéthique. 
39 In the provisions adopted by the National Assembly at first reading on January 29, 2002, post-
mortem transfer was authorized, under certain conditions (the main ones being written consent 
regarding the possibility of death and a timetable for carrying out the procedure: between 6 and 18 
months after the death). Correlatively, the terms of parenthood and inheritance law were revised. 
Concerning parenthood law, for legitimate parenthood, on the one hand, the idea of conception is 
assimilated to the start of pregnancy. The child is presumed to have been conceived between the 300th 
and 180th day prior to birth. In the case of IVF, conception is understood to begin on the day of the 
transfer, which can occur within 18 months after the man’s death. Secondly, regarding natural 
parenthood, a new article, 311-21 of the Code Civil, provides a framework for automatically 
designating the parenthood of the child, starting at the time when the father signs an authorization for 
his female partner to carry out MAP after his death. Regarding inheritance law, the point is to introduce 
an exception enabling a child born of a post-mortem transfer to be called for inheritance from his 
father, with the same rights as his siblings, if there are any (via an administrative trustee in charge of 
the case, designated by a District Court judge). Likewise, legislators provided for the maintenance of 
full joint tenancy rights as long as the deceased parent consented to post-mortem MAP, and as long as 
embryos are extant (by modifying art. 815 of Civil Code). On 30 January 2003, the Senate eliminated 
the provisions allowing post-mortem transfer. Senator Francis Giraud insisted on the difficulties 
involved in implementing this proposal, noting “the extremely low number of cases per year, the 
provisions adopted by the National Assembly actually relevant to individual law” (from the Giraud 
report: “would the mother’s suffering justify giving birth to an orphan?”). The senator pointed out legal 
obstacles he evaluated as insurmountable: first, regarding the demonstration of consent (witnessed by 
the physician? opposable by third parties?; the possibility of giving and revoking consent by last will 
and testament, the possibility that the will would not be discovered until months after the death); 
second, concerning establishing parenthood (the incompatibility between post-mortem transfer and the 
300-day rule, possible commercial exploitation of the possibility for a woman to give birth 
anonymously (“sous X”) to a child from an embryo that was transferred post-mortem, the problem of 
implantation with a third-party donor); thirdly, settling an estate (especially the knowledge by third 
parties of the existence of the embryo and the fact it had been implanted). Finally, on second reading, 
the National Assembly refused to enshrine post-mortem transfer in law, even though it had been 
approved on first reading. 
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should the couple divorce or should one of the members die”40.  Therefore, the 
prohibition was reinforced in order to avoid any misunderstanding41. 
On 22 June 2010, the Rennes appellate court rejected a petition from Fabienne 
Justel to recover the frozen sperm of her late husband, who had died in 200842. Ms. 
Justel pleaded that the sperm was part of his estate. She wished to use it for 
insemination in another country. She filed her petition for a summary judgment based 
on the argument that refusal to restore the sperm to her caused her “patently illicit 
disturbance”, a condition that met court requirements43. The Appellate Court upheld 
the ruling in the first judgment, which had been handed down in October 2009 by the 
District Court of Rennes44 by summary judgment45, following a literal interpretation 
of Article L2141-2, CSP banning insemination or embryo transfer after the death of 
one member of the couple. 
After a lengthy discussion of the issue46, the 2011 law maintained the existing 
regime, despite opinions expressed in various parliamentary reports making a 
                                                 
40 Art. L 2141-10, 2 bis, CSP. 
41 The 2004 law also introduced Art. 16-11, C. civ., according to which, in the absence of explicit 
consent from the person while living, DNA testing could not be carried out after his or her death. 
42 CA Rennes, 20 June 2010, 6th Ch., n°09/07299, Dictionnaire permanent de bioéthique, bull. July 
2010, p. 3-4 (VIGNEAU). 
43 Art. 809, C. proc. civ. 
44 TGI Rennes, 15 Oct. 2009, n°09/00588: Gaz. Pal. 21 Nov. 2009, 20, p. 10 (PIERROUX); Droit et 
santé, Nov. 2009, 32, p. 505-507 (LAMBERT-GARREL); JCP Gén. Oct. 2009, 44, p. 377 (BINET). 
45 C. Chabault-Marx (“La frilosité du juge français face à l’insémination ‘post mortem’,” D. n° 41, 
2009, p. 2758) points out that the plaintiff filed for a District Court summary judgment (under the 
conditions established by Art. 809, Code de procédure civile: i.e., to prevent imminent damage or to 
end a patently illicit disturbance); nevertheless, to date, the procedure is usually applied to labor law or 
real estate disputes, and even protection of private life. It is somewhat unusual to see it applied to a 
matter of bioethics. 
46 The draft bill presented to the cabinet in October 2010 did not mention post-mortem reproduction. 
However, an amendment was drafted in special committee, suggesting that post-mortem transfer be 
permitted in certain cases. The National Assembly adopted it on first reading. The amendment provided 
for the following means of application: written consent from the male to continue the “parental plan” 
after his death, including establishment of paternity, a timetable for implantation, causes justifying a 
refusal to transfer (marriage or remarriage). In the matter of inheritance rights, a child born following 
the implantation of an embryo fertilized in vitro at the time when the spouse or live-in male partner was 
alive would be said to be born upon conception, when his interest is at stake (an application of the 
adage Nasciturus pro iam nato habetur, quotiens de commodis eius agitur, which does not consider the 
embryo as a legal person). On January 26, 2011, the Special Committee on Bioethics authorized post 
mortem embryo transfer, opposing government opinion. The committee members adopted two identical 
amendments filed by MPs Alain Claeys and Jean-Luc Le Déaut (Socialist Party) and by Martine 
Aurillac (UMP-Center Right). The procedure would be subject to a strict timetable: the woman must 
wait for at least 6 months after the father’s death prior to undergoing implantation, and she would have 
18 months in which to succeed. The MPs pointed out that this measure would only be applied in 
“unusual situations”. Conversely, posthumous insemination remained prohibited. Nora Berra, Secretary 
of State for Health, attested to the government’s opposition to the amendment, asserting that 
authorizing post-mortem transfer would lead to “causing orphans to be born”. These provisions were 
introduced by the National Assembly on first reading, but they were rejected by the Senate on first 
reading, and have not been reintroduced since. 
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distinction, as they had during the preceding revision, between post-mortem 
insemination and embryo transfer, prohibiting the former and authorizing the latter47. 
In fact, this ban cannot be evaded by traveling to another country (unless the 
death was foreseeable and the couple entrusted the gametes to a foreign sperm bank in 
a country where post-mortem reproduction is not forbidden by law) 48. This is because 
in France, sperm and embryos are cryoconserved by the CECOS, which does not 
restore them49. Likewise, the Agence de la Biomédecine (ABM) must authorize their 
export, and it apparently systematically denies permission. 
Prohibition of post-mortem reproduction, in line with healthcare professionals’ 
position50, is debated more nowadays than when it was introduced. More specifically, 
in addition to many parliamentary reports, several legal scholars have asked for the 
legalization of post-mortem embryo transfer51. Moreover, the French National 
Consultative Ethics Committee (Comité consultatif national d’éthique, CCNE) has 
repeatedly published opinions endorsing legalization of post-mortem embryo 
transfer52. Its most recent opinion on the subject, published in 201153, suggested that 
                                                 
47 Rapport parlementaire n° 2832, L’enfant d’abord, 100 propositions pour placer l’intérêt de l’enfant 
au cœur du droit de la famille, (V. Pecresse, P. Bloche), La Documentation française, April 2006; 
OPECST, 20 Nov. 2008, L'évaluation de l'application de la loi du 6 août 2004 relative à la bioéthique 
(A. Clayes, J.-B. Vialatte); Assemblée nationale, Rapport d’information n° 2235, la Mission 
d’information sur la révision des lois de bioéthique (A. Claeys, J. Leonetti), January 2010. A contrario, 
Conseil d’État, La révision des lois de bioéthique, 2009, La Documentation française. 
48 Such as Belgium, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Spain, or Israel. 
49 Every year, the CECOS receive 4 or 5 requests for “recovery” of sperm from women whose 
husbands have died (Le Point, 11 March 2010). 
50 According to the report drafted after the October 1, 2008 “Experts’ Day’’ (Questionnaire Assistance 
Médicale à la Procréation GEFF, BLEFCO with the participation of the Collège National des 
Gynécologues Obstétriciens (CNGOF), the Société Française de Gynécologie (SFG) and the 
Fédération Nationale des Collèges de Gynécologie Médicale (FNCGM), drafted by J. Belaisch-Allart, 
Ph Merviel et P Clement), only 19% of practitioners are in favor of providing services to widows. They 
admit that an embryo-transfer situation is much more problematical than a simple insemination. They 
believe that the CECOS sperm banks, who have been dealing with this type of request for almost 30 
years, usually in the days or weeks following the death of the husband, have observed that the request 
often disappeared once the widow managed to work through the mourning process. 
51 For legalizing access to post-mortem procreation, see C. Chabault-Marx, “La frilosité du juge 
français face à l’insémination ‘post mortem”, cited above; V. Depadt-Sebag, “La procréation post 
mortem’’,  D. 2011, p. 2213; M. Matei, “L’insémination artificielle post mortem ou lorsque le désir 
d’enfant devient un problème bioéthique”, Gaz. Pal., spécial Droit de la santé, n° 15-16, January 2010, 
p. 27-29; J. Rubellin Devichi, JCP, Gén., 1994, Chron. dr. fam., n° 24, 3771. A contrario, for 
maintaining the prohibition on any form of post-mortem procreation, see v. J. HAauser, “Procréation 
post-mortem: un nouveau droit à ..., le droit à l’éternité?”, RTD civ., 2010, p. 93; A. Mirkovic, “Un 
enfant ne peut être conçu après le décès de son père,” JCP, Gén., n°37, Sep. 2010, 897. 
52 CCNE, Avis n° 40 sur le transfert d’embryons après décès du conjoint (ou du concubin), 17 
December 1993, unable to see “who or what authority could ultimately assert for embryos rights equal 
to or greater than those of the woman, and oppose her intention, duly informed and explicitly stated, to 
undertake a pregnancy following the transfer of frozen embryos… the death of the man does not annul 
the rights the woman might consider she has to these embryos, the result of a procedure in which she 
and her late partner were engaged”; Avis n°60, 25 June 1998 relatif au réexamen des lois de bioéthique; 
avis n°67 sur l’avant-projet de révision des lois de bioéthique, 18 January 2000; avis n° 105, 9 Oct. 
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the legal difficulties associated with post-mortem reproduction could be solved, and 
that the legalization issue itself was a matter of ethics, not of law. 
In the United Kingdom, the legislation has never made a distinction between 
posthumous insemination with frozen sperm and embryo transfer following the death 
of the biological father. The decisive matter was obtaining the consent of both 
members of the couple, regardless of how far they had progressed in their intention to 
become parents. This position can also be explained by the fact that the British regime 
never sought to imitate either a family model or a naturalist one. In the British 
understanding, medically-assisted procreation is a method that exists alongside 
spontaneous procreation. 
Despite the recommendations of the Warnock Report, actively discouraging 
the practice of inseminating a widow with sperm from her deceased husband54, the 
law passed in 1990 did not provide for any explicit prohibition of it. According to 
§28(6)(b), “Where… the sperm of a man, or any embryo the creation of which was 
brought about with his sperm, was used after his death, he is not to be treated as the 
father of the child”. As a result, the child could make no claim to the estate of his 
genetic father, and would be stripped of paternal filiation. 
The Diane Blood case received extensive coverage in the media, and caused a 
change in the situation. Specifically, when Mr. Blood was on his deathbed, in a coma 
from meningitis, a sample of his sperm was retrieved by electroejaculation. His 
widow hoped to be inseminated with it, and applied to the Human Fertilisation and 
                                                                                                                                            
2008, Questionnements pour les États généraux de la bioéthique. 
53 CCNE, avis n° 113, 10 Feb. 2011, La demande d’assistance médicale à la procréation après le décès 
de l’homme faisant partie du couple. The French national ethics committee CCNE set three conditions 
on authorizing posthumous embryo transfer: 1. While alive, the man has to have given explicit consent 
to the transfer, after his death, of a frozen embryo; 2. The woman must deliberate her decision to 
undergo implantation for a certain amount of time following the death of her husband, to avoid making 
a decision when she is “in a state of great vulnerability”. Should she decide to go ahead with 
implantation, she must undergo the procedure within a certain number of months so that “the birth of 
the child does not occur too long after the father’s death”. Also, she must be offered counseling. 3. 
Legal changes are necessary so that “the child’s paternity is established”. In the opinion of the 
committee members, refusing the woman’s request for embryo transfer places her “in a situation made 
even more painful by the fact that she is forced to make an impossible choice” as to the fate of the 
embryo: destruction, donation to research, or donation to another couple. Also, “the fact that the birth 
of a fatherless child is intentionally planned is not sufficient grounds, in itself, for justifying a 
prohibition on post-mortem reproduction” (p. 11). 
54 A Question of Life - The Warnock Report on Human Fertilisation and Embryology, London, Basil 
Blackwell, 1985, p. 55, §10.9. According to the authors of this report, if one of the members of a couple 
dies, “the right to use or dispose of any embryo stored by that couple should pass to the survivor”. If 
both partners die, “the right should pass to the storage authority”. Likewise, recommendation 61 
suggested that the draft bill should specify that any child conceived with IVF who had not been 
transferred in utero before the date of the father’s death should be deprived of any inheritance rights. 
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Embryology Authority (HFEA) for the release of the sperm from the facility where it 
was stored, the Infertility Research Trust. The HFEA refused to give Ms. Blood 
authorization to use it on British soil, due to the absence of the required written 
consent55. The authority also refused to order the release of the sperm for delivery to a 
facility abroad, a decision it had the power to make on the grounds of its discretionary 
authority56. Ms. Blood requested a judicial review of the ruling. In the first instance, 
her request was rejected, on the same grounds of absence of consent57. She appealed 
the ruling, arguing that on the one hand, §4(1)(b) of the 1990 law exempted from the 
consent rule couples who had undergone treatment together, the way she and her late 
husband had. She also pleaded that the ruling refusing to send the sperm abroad was a 
violation of her right to obtain healthcare services in other European Union member 
states. In February 1997, the Court of Appeal58 ruled that the legal exception Ms. 
Blood cited applied only when the sperm had already been used as is, and not when it 
was merely frozen. As a result, this exception did not apply in the Diane Blood case, 
and the HFEA had no right to authorize insemination on British soil. However, the 
judges did determine that European Union law was applicable, and that by refusing to 
grant Ms. Blood authorization to go abroad with the sperm, the HFEA had failed to 
take into consideration her right to medical treatment abroad, according to articles 59 
and 60 of the Treaty of Rome, establishing a direct and enforceable right to receive 
healthcare services in another member State. The judges concluded that the 
permission to export the sperm would not constitute undesired precedent. According 
to Lord Chief Justice Woolf, “Because this judgment makes it clear that the sperm of 
Mr. Blood has been preserved and stored when it should not have been, this case 
raises issues as to the lawfulness of the use and export of sperm which should never 
arise again…There should be, after this judgment has been given, no further cases 
where sperm is preserved without consent”. 
Actually, the Court of Appeal broached the subject of consent to storage, 
without ruling on that of the retrieval itself, whereas storing sperm retrieved from an 
                                                 
55 §4(1), Schedule 3 of the 1990 law. 
56 §24(4) of the 1990 law. 
57 The first-instance ruling was never published. 
58 R v HFEA (1997) 2 A II ER 687. D. Morgan, R. Lee, “In the name of the father? Ex Parte Blood 
Dealing with Novelty and Anomality,” Modern Law Review, 1997, 60, p. 840-855; J. Flauss-Diem, 
“Insémination post-mortem, droit anglais et droit communautaire,” in Liber amicorum M.-T. Meulders 
Klein, Bruylant, 1998, p. 217-230; R. Sefton-Green, “La procréation médicalement assistée entre droit 
national et droit communautaire”, Rev. gén. droit médical, numéro spécial - la recherche sur l’embryon, 
2000, p. 101-107; J.-S. BERGÉ, “Le droit communautaire dévoyé. Le cas Blood”, JCP Gén., n°7-8, 16 
Feb. 2000, p. 289-293. 
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unconscious man without his consent was an infraction. As a result, the Infertility 
Research Trust was not found guilty. Let us note that the judges did not authorize 
insemination in the absence of donor consent. The only permission they granted was 
to export the sperm on the basis of European Union law, to evade the lack of 
consent59. 
Following the ruling by the Court of Appeal, Ms. Blood took the sperm to 
Belgium, a country where MAP was unregulated at the time. She gave birth to two 
sons, one after the other, from the same sample. Influenced by media coverage of the 
case, the British government commissioned a report from Dr. Sheila McLean on 
Common Law consent procedures and the 1990 Human Fertility and Embryology 
Act60. Published in July 1998, the McLean report recommended that the requirement 
for written consent be maintained for treatments covered by the 1990 Act. 
As a result, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Deceased Fathers) Act 
was adopted in 2003. It explicitly permitted posthumous insemination as well as 
embryo transfer, as long as the deceased father had given his consent while alive. The 
mother could request that the deceased father be registered as the child’s father on the 
birth certificate, as long as the father had signed written consent prior to his death. It 
thereby added a possibility for paternity to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act of 1990 in §1(1)5A, setting the following conditions: 
- If the embryo had been fertilized with the semen of a deceased man after his death, 
or if it had been fertilized prior to his death but transferred to the woman’s uterus after 
his death; 
- If the woman had been married to this man prior to his death; 
- If the man had given his consent in writing, and, prior to his death, had not 
withdrawn his consent for the use of his sperm or for the transfer of the embryo 
fertilized with his sperm after his death; 
- If, within 42 days after the child’s birth, the mother declares in writing that this man 
is indeed the father, and that no other man can be designated as the father61. 
                                                 
59 For a critique of this use of EU law as a means of evading national bans, see J. S. BERGÉ, “Le droit 
communautaire dévoyé. Le cas Blood”, cited above, or a critique of the way the judges implicitly 
assimilated gametes with export goods, see J. Flauss-Diem, “Insémination post-mortem, droit anglais 
et droit communautaire”, cited above. 
60 Consent and the law: Review of the Common Law provisions relating to the Removal of gametes 
and of the consent provisions in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, 1998. 
61 If - 
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The same rules are applied to an unmarried couple who has undergone 
treatment together, as well as to a couple, married or not, who conceived an embryo 
following a donation of sperm. This written consent, containing certification by a 
registered medical practitioner as to the medical facts concerned, must be filed in a 
special register, in order to record the birth of the child. 
We shall specify that appropriate consent must be accurate: that is, it must 
name a particular individual, thereby avoiding confusion, such as grandparental 
claims. The Act was retroactively effective62; as a result, it covered children born after 
1 August 199163. It is important to note that the law went into effect while §13(5) of 
the 1990 Act stipulated that access to treatment was contingent upon “the welfare of 
any child who may be born as a result of the treatment (including the need of that 
child for a father), and of any other child who may be affected by the birth”. In the 
2008 law, this clause regarding “the need for a father” was replaced by “the need for 
supportive parenting”. 
Therefore, even if access to MAP was not prohibited for single women, the 
authors of the law considered that the child’s welfare required the existence of a father 
figure in his family circle, a figure that cannot exist for a child conceived 
posthumously. Lastly, §1(1)5I64 defined the scope of the paternity under discussion. It 
                                                                                                                                            
(a) a child has been carried by a woman as the result of the placing in her of an embryo or of sperm and 
eggs or her artificial insemination, 
(b) the creation of the embryo carried by her was brought about by using the sperm of a man after his 
death, or the creation of the embryo was brought about using the sperm of a man before his death but 
the embryo was placed in the woman after his death, 
(c) the woman was a party to a marriage with the man immediately before his death, 
(d) the man consented in writing (and did not withdraw the consent) — (i) to the use of his sperm after 
his death which brought about the creation of the embryo carried by the woman or (as the case may be) 
to the placing in the woman after his death of the embryo which was brought about using his sperm 
before his death, and (ii) to being treated for the purpose mentioned in subsection (5I) below as the 
father of any resulting child, 
(e) the woman has elected in writing not later than the end of the period of 42 days from the day on 
which the child was born for the man to be treated for the purpose mentioned in subsection (5I) below 
as the father of the child, and 
(f) no-one else is to be treated as the father of the child by virtue of subsection (2) or (3) above or by 
virtue of adoption or the child being treated as mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (5) 
above, then the man shall be treated for the purpose mentioned in subsection (5I) below as the father of 
the child”. 
62 §3(1). 
63 Therefore, Mrs. Blood’s children were henceforth considered legitimate. 
64 “The purpose referred to … is the purpose of enabling the man’s particulars to be entered as the 
particulars of the child’s father in (as the case may be) a register of live- births or still-births kept under 
the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953 or the Births and Deaths Registration (Northern Ireland) 
Order 1976 or a register of births or still-births kept under the Registration of Births, Deaths and 
Marriages (Scotland) Act 1965”. This provision was maintained in §39(3) of the 2008 law: “the 
purpose referred to in subsection (1) is the purpose of enabling the man’s particulars to be entered as 
the particulars of the child’s father in a relevant register of births”, and §40(4), identical in content. 
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actually merely covered the registration of the child at birth; more precisely, the fact 
that the father’s name could be listed as such on the birth certificate. Other 
implications of paternity, such as the transmission of inheritance rights, titles of 
nobility, or rights to nationality, were not applicable, according to this understanding. 
Clearly, the goal of the system for regulating posthumous reproduction was to assist 
these families, widows and children born of assisted conception to forge an identity 
for themselves. However, the question of inheritance rights was never broached, no 
doubt in order to avoid abuses65. 
The 2008 law incorporated these provisions. Its §39 covers children conceived 
by assisted reproduction, with the sperm of a deceased father, by artificial 
insemination or embryo transfer, regardless of whether the man and woman were 
married. Provided that the deceased man signed written consent prior to death, he is 
considered to be the father of the child conceived after his death. §40 concerns the 
case of sperm donation: it makes a distinction on the basis of whether the woman is 
married. If she is not married, §40(2)(b) provides that the embryo must have been 
conceived during treatment by a licensed practitioner in the United Kingdom66. 
Likewise, §46 extends the possibility of parenthood to the deceased woman partner in 
a same-sex Civil Partnership if, prior to death, she has signed written consent to 
parenthood (§46(1)), as long as the embryo was not created at a time when the woman 
who carried it was in a marriage or civil partnership, and that another person had 
signed written consent establishing parenthood (§46(2)) 67. In this case, the issue is not 
paternity, but parenthood: the partner of the woman who bore the child conceived by 
MAP is considered by law to be the second parent. 
However, long before the 2008 law went into effect, the presumption of the 
judges in the Diane Blood case – i.e., that there would never again be a case of sperm 
conservation in the absence of prior consent – was proven false. Let us examine the 
ruling in L v HFEA in 200868. This case concerns the claim made by a woman who 
wanted to be inseminated with her deceased husband’s sperm, retrieved without his 
consent shortly after his sudden and unexpected death. The claim included the right to 
store the sperm for use in the United Kingdom, or the right to transfer it to another 
                                                 
65 This was recommended by the Warnock Report (A Question of Life - The Warnock Report on 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology, cited above, recommendation 61). 
66 Although whether the source of the gametes is the husband (§39(2)) or a third-party donor (§40(3)), 
paternity is established, whether insemination or embryo transfer take place in the United Kingdom or 
on foreign territory. 
67 Applying the agreed female parenthood conditions set forth in §44 of the act. 
68 L v HFEA (2008) EWHC 2149 (Fam). 
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country, for storage and use there. At the same time, a request for authorization to 
export the sperm was submitted to the HFEA. The Authority suspended the request, 
however, until a judicial decision on the legality of the storage was handed down. Just 
as in the Blood case, the widow’s claim was based on incompatibility with 
supranational law; but in this case, it was grounded on article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, ECHR (the right to respect for private and family life). 
The High Court of Justice dismissed the case, chiefly on the basis of the 
absence of consent from the partner. The judges pointed out that the absolute and 
bright line rules relating to effective consent for storage were within the margin of 
appreciation of the member states, as had been confirmed in the Evans ruling69. It is 
interesting to note that, according to the judges, the HFEA has the discretion, 
following the Blood case, to authorize the exportation of gametes; the fact that the 
storage of the gametes could be challenged does not rule out this discretionary power, 
lodged in §24(4) of the 1990 law. Therefore, even though in general, storage without 
consent is forbidden, and can be considered a criminal offence, in this specific case, 
the HFEA indicated that it did not intend to pursue regulatory action against the 
clinic, or to order the destruction of the sperm. Concerning the incompatibility of the 
HFEA decision with the ECHR, the judges asserted that the issue could not be ruled 
upon until the HFEA had published a decision on exporting the gametes. Judge 
Charles observed that the case was an opportunity to provide guidelines regarding 
whether the court could grant effective relief relating to the retrieval of sperm from a 
deceased husband, but that in the absence of a request from the Secretary of State for 
Health to rule on this issue, he was not convinced that it was lawful to retrieve 
gametes from a deceased person who had not given consent prior to death, even if the 
claimant had demonstrated that the intention of the deceased man to have children 
was at least as compelling as the evidence advanced by Diane Blood70. 
This case demonstrates the omnipotence of the HFEA: on the one hand, the 
authority possesses discretionary decision-making power on the import and export of 
gametes, even if they were extracted in the absence of the person’s consent, and 
therefore unlawfully. On the other hand, the HFEA can elect to waive legal 
                                                 
69 CEDH, 10 April 2007, Evans v UK, Grand Chamber, Application No. 6339/05 (JCP Gén. 2007, II, 
10097 (MATHIEU); RTD civ. 2007, p. 295 (MARGUÉNAUD); Rev. trim. dr. fam. 2008, p. 708 
(GALLUS); RTDH 2008, p. 879 (MARGUNÉAUD); RDC, 1st August 2007, n° 4, p. 1321 (F. 
BELLIVIER et C. NOIVILLE). 
70 The couple already had one child together, and six days before the husband’s death, they had sought 
information on the possibility of proceeding with IVF, due to the wife’s age. 
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proceedings, even when it has taken note of a criminal violation. Therefore, loopholes 
in the legal framework can be found. 
It seems that the reasoning that was the basis for authorizing posthumous 
assisted procreation for insemination and embryo transfer is equally valid in the field 
of surrogacy. In the 2011 ruling on A & A v P, P & B71, the High Court of Justice 
granted a parental order to a married couple72 for a child born in India whose 
intentional father, who was also the child’s biological father, died five months after 
the request for the Parental Order was submitted. The ruling was explicitly based on 
the intention of the Parliament when the 2008 Act was adopted; i.e., that surrogacy 
agreements could only be made by persons in an enduring relationship, and that it 
opposed applications by single persons to become parents. The primary goal of §54 
was to establish a legal relationship between the child and the intentional parents. 
Moreover, refusing to grant a parental order could have harmful consequences on the 
child, whose welfare is the most important consideration. The child would be 
deprived of official filiation with his biological father, and would thereby be denied 
the social and emotional benefits of this bond, as well as the financial disadvantages. 
He will suffer from the incompatibility of legal reality and daily life, and from 
identity problems (Article 8, demanding protection for the child’s right to an identity, 
would thereby not be respected). 
This leads us to a paradoxical observation: although posthumous assisted 
reproduction involves single women, and is based on the reasoning that individual 
procreation is possible, it ultimately results in couple-based reasoning, because it 
allows a deceased person to become a father and, indirectly, prolong the couple’s 
history. 
Conclusion 
Despite a legal framework for post-mortem reproduction, or attempts to 
constitute one, the couple-based model persists. In fact, even under the most liberal 
systems, this “couple model” appears to be immovable. 
Whereas the evolution of MAP towards increasing autonomy could explain 
the emergence of claims from single persons who are would-be parents, we are forced 
to observe that the couple-based strategy has been upheld and even strengthened. 
                                                 
71 A & A v P, P &B (2011) EWHC 1738 (Fam). 
72 Based on §54 of the 2008 Act. 
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Support for the model is due in large part to psychological studies of children who 
grew up in homoparental families. They concluded that the parents’ sexual orientation 
played a minor role in comparison to that played by the availability of two adults in a 
harmonious and stable environment73. The couple-based strategy, which originated 
with attempts to establish a normative model of the heterosexual couple, has been 
adopted by LGBT activists who very often position themselves as couples in their 
claims for access to MAP74. 
Of the two countries studied, France is the one where the couple model was 
promoted most energetically in the legislative regulation of MAP, a logical 
consequence of the “couple myth” in French law. In fact, some scholars consider that 
“the concept of the ‘‘couple” is probably the newest and most significant contribution 
of the law dated 19 July 1994 on medically-assisted procreation75”. In the Braibant 
Report, MAP was to be offered to “two parents, and not one more; two parents, and 
not one less76”. Two decades later, during the parliamentary debates prior to the 
revision of the law in 2011, two reports, although they took opposing positions, were 
alike in citing the couple as the framework justifying access to MAP: the Terranova 
Report77, self-defined as “progressive,” recommended that unmarried couples be 
granted access to adoption and MAP, regardless of how long they have been living 
together, claiming that the intention to become parents is, in itself, an indication the 
couple is stable78. The Leonetti Report79, based on medical authority, insisted on the 
                                                 
73 S. Golombok et al., “Children with Lesbian Parents: A Community Study”, Developmental 
Psychology, 39, no.1, Jan. 2003, p. 20-33; W. Manning, K. Lamb, “Adolescent Well-Being in 
Cohabiting, Married, and Single Families”, Journal of Marriage and the Family, n° 65, Nov. 2003, p. 
876-893; S. Brown, “Family Structure and Child Well-Being: The Significance of Parental 
Cohabitation”, Journal of Marriage and the Family, n° 66, May 2004, p. 351-367; G. Neises, C. 
GrüneberG, “Socioeconomic Situation and Health Outcomes of Single Parents”, Journal of Public 
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fact that MAP should be used to treat infertility, not for reasons of convenience. This 
report tends to oppose medical arguments to claims for access to MAP from single 
women. It cites the fact that sterility is a difficult condition to diagnose precisely; in 
other words, sterility cannot be “verified” in the absence of a male partner. Likewise, 
within the framework of the 2011 revision of the law, the Senate surprisingly offered 
access to MAP to lesbian couples, thereby excluding single homosexual women. This 
amendment was struck down. 
In the United Kingdom, the absence of the couple-based model in the 1990 
law gave single women an opportunity to fulfill their wish to have children via MAP. 
However, paradoxically, the couple appeared, as we saw, in authorization for post-
mortem reproduction. Likewise, it reappeared later, in the 2008 law, by authorizing 
the recognition of parenthood from the birth of a child conceived through MAP by 
same-sex parents. 
In cases of surrogacy, as well, the Parental Order, hitherto limited to married 
(and therefore necessarily heterosexual) couples, is now accessible to other couples, 
both heterosexual and homosexual. When the law was revised, the British Parliament 
explicitly requested that surrogacy contracts be signed only by persons living in a 
stable couple relationship, not by single persons. 
Seen from this perspective it is clear that the United Kingdom, although it 
differs from France by granting single women access to MAP, also reasons on the 
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